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The Cost Of Transfers

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  • Gordon Tullock

Abstract

Additional discussions of transfers have pointed out that they are essentially costless to society as a whole. This article discusses the investment of resources in obtaining transfers or attempting to avoid transfers away from ego. In any situation in which transfers are likely, it must be assumed that profit‐seeking individuals will invest resources in attempting to get them or prevent them, if the transfer is away from some individual. The problem is discussed in the areas of voluntary charity, bargaining, governmental income redistribution, theft, and war. Üblicherweise wird in der Diskussion urn Transferzahlungen angenommen, dass deren Vornahme praktisch keine gesellschaftlichen Ressourcen in Anspruch nimmt. Vorliegender Artikel befasst sich mit den Kosten, die notwendigerweise entstehen, wenn jemand die Ausrichtung einer Transferzahlung erreichen oder aber die Entrichtung eigener Zahlungen verhindern will. In jedem gesellschaftlichen Zustand, in dem die Wahrscheinlichkeit hoch ist, dass es zur Entrichtung von Transferzahlungen kommt, werden profitmaximierende Individuen Ressourcen in den Erhalt (oder die Abwendung) von Transferzahlungen investieren. Die sich daraus ergebenden Probleme werden anhand der Bereiche der freiwilligen karitativen Tätigkeit, des bargaining, der staatlichen Einkommensumverteilung, des Diebstahls and des Kriegs erläutert. Des discussions portant sur les transferts dégagent le fait que ceux‐ci n'entrainent pratiquement aucune dépense pour la société dans son ensemble. Le present article traite de l'investissement de ressources lorsqu'on essaie d'obtenir le paiement ou d'éviter le versement de transferts. Dans une situation quelconque oü des transferts apparaissent comme probables, it est admis que les individus, dont le profit décroit, investiront des ressources afin d'obtenir ou d'éviter des paiements de transferts. Le même problème est débattu dans les cas suivants: la charité volontaire, le marché, la redistribution des revenus gouvernementaux, le vol et la guerre.

Suggested Citation

  • Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The Cost Of Transfers," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 629-643, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:24:y:1971:i:4:p:629-643
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1971.tb00624.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Rowley, Charles K., 2000. "Political culture and economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 133-158, March.
    2. Timothy Besley & Hannes Mueller, 2018. "Predation, Protection, and Productivity: A Firm-Level Perspective," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 184-221, April.
    3. Sergey V. Popov, 2015. "Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(1), pages 108-125, January.
    4. Wadho, Waqar & Ayaz, Umair, 2017. "Government Size and Economic Growth in an Endogenous Growth Model with Rent-seeking," GLO Discussion Paper Series 131, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    5. Makovi, Michael, 2015. "The Welfare Costs of Rent-Seeking: A Methodologically Individualist & Subjectivist Revision," MPRA Paper 63270, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Emily Chamlee-Wright & Virgil Storr, 2010. "Expectations of government’s response to disaster," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 253-274, July.
    7. E. Pasour, 1981. "Pareto optimality as a guide to income redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 75-87, January.
    8. Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
    9. Lorz, Oliver, 1998. "Capital mobility, tax competition, and lobbying for redistributive capital taxation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 265-279, May.
    10. Jac C. Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, 2013. "Institutions, Lobbying, and Economic Performance," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 360-386, November.
    11. Arye L. Hillman, 2021. "Harming a favored side: an anomaly with supreme values and good intentions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 275-285, March.
    12. Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
    13. Otto Lehto & John Meadowcroft, 2021. "Welfare without rent seeking? Buchanan’s demogrant proposal and the possibility of a constitutional welfare state," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 145-164, June.
    14. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. "Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 221-241, July.
    15. Makovi, Michael, 2016. "New Wine in Old Flasks: the Just Price and Price-Controls in Jewish Law," MPRA Paper 69119, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. William C. Mitchell, 1990. "Interest Groups: Economic Perspectives and Contributions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 85-108, January.
    17. Waqar Wadho & Umair Ayaz, 2018. "Government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with rent†seeking," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 151-179, March.
    18. Christian Morrisson & Philippe Cazenave, 1973. "Fonctions d'utilité interdépendantes et théorie de la redistribution en économie de production," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 24(5), pages 725-760.
    19. Cristian Pérez Muñoz & Joshua D Potter, 2014. "Street-level charity: Beggars, donors, and welfare policies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(1), pages 158-174, January.
    20. Soeren C. Schwuchow, 2023. "Organized crime as a link between inequality and corruption," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 469-509, June.
    21. Paul Aligica & Vlad Tarko, 2012. "State capitalism and the rent-seeking conjecture," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 357-379, December.

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