Extendable Cooperative Games
AbstractA (TU) cooperative game is extendable if every core allocation of each subgame can be extended to a core allocation of the game. It is strongly extendable if any minimal vector in the upper core of any of its subgames can be extended to a core allocation. We prove that strong extendability is equivalent to largeness of the core. Further, we characterize extendability in terms of an extension of the balanced cover of the game. It is also shown how this extension can unify the analysis of many families of games under one roof. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 9 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
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