Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Fair and Efficient Compensation for Taking Property under Uncertainty

Contents:

Author Info

  • T. NICOLAUS TIDEMAN
  • FLORENZ PLASSMANN
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Existing mechanisms for managing eminent domain suggest that, when there is uncertainty about whether a government will take property, efficiency requires that the property owner receive at most partial compensation. We argue that announcing the possibility of a taking is itself a taking when this implies that further investments will not be compensated. We argue that it is both fair and efficient to require governments to compensate owners for losses in asset value from such announcements. We propose a mechanism that provides incentives for both efficient investment and efficient takings, while paying full compensation for expected losses under efficient behavior. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Inc..

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00213.x
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 7 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 3 (08)
    Pages: 471-495

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:7:y:2005:i:3:p:471-495

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1097-3923

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2011. "Regulatory Takings," Working papers 2011-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    2. Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2007. "Efficient Urban Renewal Without Takings: Two Solutions to the Land Assembly Problem," Working Papers e07-8, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
    3. Asaf Friedman Arch, 2014. "Sustainable Urban Renewal: The Tel Aviv Dilemma," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(5), pages 2527-2537, April.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:7:y:2005:i:3:p:471-495. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.