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Decentralization in Pollution Permit Markets

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  • Andrew Yates

Abstract

A pollution permit market is decentralized when firms are allowed to trade permits across time, regions or pollutants. Using a model in which firms have better information about their abatement costs than a regulator, we develop a comparative advantage formula that delineates whether or not pollution permit markets should be decentralized. When the damage from pollution is described by a separable function, the formula implies a simple sufficient condition for not allowing decentralization. Copyright Blackwell Publishing, Inc. 2002.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 641-660

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:4:y:2002:i:4:p:641-660

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Cited by:
  1. Andrew Yates, 2012. "On a Fundamental Advantage of Permits Over Taxes for the Control of Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 51(4), pages 583-598, April.
  2. Fell, Harrison & MacKenzie, Ian A. & Pizer, William A., 2008. "Prices versus Quantities versus Bankable Quantities," Discussion Papers dp-08-32, Resources For the Future.
  3. Pizer, William & Newell, Richard, 1998. "Regulating Stock Externalities Under Uncertainty," Discussion Papers dp-99-10-rev, Resources For the Future.
  4. Roberton Williams, 2002. "Prices vs. Quantities vs. Tradable Quantities," NBER Working Papers 9283, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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