Free Riding on Altruism and Group Size
AbstractIt is shown that altruism does not affect the equilibrium provision of public goods although altruism takes the form of unconditional commitment to contribute. The reason is that altruistic contributions completely crowd out selfish voluntary contributions. That is, egoists free ride on altruism. It is also shown that public goods are less likely to be provided in larger groups. The only qualification to our results is when the probability of altruism is so high that it is a dominant strategy for all egoistic players to free ride. In this case, actually, both altruism and the larger group facilitate public good provision. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923
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Other versions of this item:
- HINDRIKS , Jean & PANCS, Romans, . "Free riding on altruism and group size," CORE Discussion Papers RP, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1560, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jean Hindriks & Romans Pancs, 2001. "Free Riding on Altruism and Group Size," Working Papers, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance 436, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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