Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Continuous-Strategy Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription Game
AbstractWe reconsider Laussel and Palfrey's analysis of private provision of discrete public goods via the subscription game. We show their semi-regular equilibria do not exist, casting doubt on their efficiency analysis. Taking players' values for the public good as uniformly distributed on , we exhibit previously unrecognized continuous equilibria-those with contribution strategies strictly increasing up to their maximum values, not necessarily equal to the provision cost, c, at which point they become flat. We show piecewise-linear equilibria are not incentive efficient; and if and , then all symmetric equilibria are interim incentive inefficient. Copyright � 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923
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- Stefano Barbieri & David A. Malueg, 2009.
"Threshold Uncertainty in the Private-Information Subscription Game,"
0903, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Barbieri, Stefano & Malueg, David A., 2010. "Threshold uncertainty in the private-information subscription game," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 848-861, December.
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