This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Continuous-Strategy Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription Game Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics STEFANO BARBIERI
DAVID A. MALUEG
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
We reconsider Laussel and Palfrey's analysis of private provision of discrete public goods via the subscription game. We show their semi-regular equilibria do not exist, casting doubt on their efficiency analysis. Taking players' values for the public good as uniformly distributed on , we exhibit previously unrecognized continuous equilibria-those with contribution strategies strictly increasing up to their maximum values, not necessarily equal to the provision cost, c, at which point they become flat. We show piecewise-linear equilibria are not incentive efficient; and if and , then all symmetric equilibria are interim incentive inefficient. Copyright © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory .
Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
Pages: 529-545
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:10:y:2008:i:4:p:529-545Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923
Order Information: Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1097-3923
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Keywords:
Access and
download statistics Did you know? IDEAS also indexes books .
This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .