Does high involvement management lead to higher pay?
AbstractUsing nationally representative survey data for Finnish employees linked to register data on their wages and work histories we find wage effects of high involvement management (HIM) practices are generally positive and significant. However, employees with better wage and work histories are more likely to enter HIM jobs. The wage premium falls substantially having accounted for employeesâ work histories suggesting that existing studiesâ estimates are upwardly biased due to positive selection into HIM. Results do not differ significantly when using propensity score matching as opposed to standard regression techniques. The premium rises with the number of HIM practices and differs markedly across different types of HIM practice.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Statistical Society in its journal Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society).
Volume (Year): 176 (2013)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Other versions of this item:
- Böckerman, Petri & Bryson, Alex & Ilmakunnas, Pekka, 2011. "Does high involvement management lead to higher pay?," MPRA Paper 28711, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dr Alex Bryson, 2011. "Does High Involvement Managment Lead to Higher Pay?," NIESR Discussion Papers, National Institute of Economic and Social Research 2908, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
- Petri Böckerman & Alex Bryson & Pekka Ilmakunnas, 2011. "Does high involvement management lead to higher pay?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 38575, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Alex Bryson & Petri Böckerman & Pekka Ilmakunnas, 2011. "Does High Involvement Management Lead to Higher Pay?," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE dp1046, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- M53 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Training
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting
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