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Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-division Procedures

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  • I. D. Hill
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    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-985X.2008.00561_3.x
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Royal Statistical Society in its journal Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society).

    Volume (Year): 171 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 1032-1033

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:jorssa:v:171:y:2008:i:4:p:1032-1033

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    Cited by:
    1. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2011. "Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule," MPRA Paper 30388, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Brams, Steven J & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2010. "Satisfaction approval voting," MPRA Paper 22709, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2008. "How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games," MPRA Paper 12751, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & Christian Klamler, 2012. "The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 615-631, July.
    5. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2011. "When does approval voting make the "right choices"?," MPRA Paper 34262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Brams, Steven J. & Jones, Michael A. & Klamler, Christian, 2011. "N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division," MPRA Paper 34264, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J., 2011. "Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts," MPRA Paper 34263, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Marc Kilgour & Steven J. Brams, 2009. "Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2009.41, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    9. Dall'Aglio, M. & Brânzei, R. & Tijs, S.H., 2008. "Cooperation in Dividing the Cake," Discussion Paper 2008-101, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    10. Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J., 2010. "Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts," MPRA Paper 22703, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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