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Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors?

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Author Info
MARK L. DEFOND
REBECCA N. HANN
XUESONG HU
Abstract

We examine three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of 702 newly appointed outside directors assigned to audit committees during a period before implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Motivated by the SOX requirement that public companies disclose whether they have a financial expert on their audit committee, we test whether the market reacts favorably to the appointment of directors with financial expertise to the audit committee. In addition, because it is controversial whether SOX should define financial experts narrowly to include primarily "accounting" financial experts (as initially proposed) or more broadly to include "nonaccounting" financial experts (as ultimately passed), we separately examine appointments of each type of expert. We find a positive market reaction to the appointment of "accounting" financial experts assigned to audit committees but no reaction to "nonaccounting" financial experts assigned to audit committees, consistent with accounting-based financial skills, but not broader financial skills, improving the audit committee's ability to ensure high-quality financial reporting. In addition, we find that this positive reaction is concentrated among firms with relatively strong corporate governance, consistent with "accounting" financial expertise complementing strong governance, possibly because strong governance helps channel the expertise toward enhancing shareholder value. Together, these findings are consistent with financial expertise on audit committees improving corporate governance but only when both the expert and the appointing firm possess characteristics that facilitate the effective use of the expertise. Copyright University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2005.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2005.00166.x
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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Accounting Research.

Volume (Year): 43 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
Pages: 153-193
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Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:43:y:2005:i:2:p:153-193

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  1. Barbara Schöndube-Pirchegger, 2007. "Corporate Governance, Reputation Concerns, and Herd Behavior," FEMM Working Papers 07006, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
  2. Anna Rose & Jacob Rose, 2008. "Management Attempts to Avoid Accounting Disclosure Oversight: The Effects of Trust and Knowledge on Corporate Directors’ Governance Ability," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 83(2), pages 193-205, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Alix Valenti, 2008. "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Has It Brought About Changes in the Boards of Large U. S. Corporations?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 81(2), pages 401-412, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. David Yermack, 2006. "Board Members and Company Value," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 33-47, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kuang, Flora Yu & Qin, Bo, 2006. "Performance-vested stock options and pay-performance sensitivity," Discussion Paper 123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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