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Price Discrimination In Stackelberg Competition

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  • LEVENT KUTLU

Abstract

We examine the effects of price discrimination in the Stackelberg competition model for the linear demand case. We show that the leader does not use any price discrimination at all. Rather, the follower does all price discrimination. The leader directs all of its first mover preemptive advantage to attract the highest value consumers who pay a uniformly high price. We observe that profits and total welfare are larger and consumer surplus is smaller than those of the standard Stackelberg competition model.

Suggested Citation

  • Levent Kutlu, 2009. "Price Discrimination In Stackelberg Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 364-364, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:57:y:2009:i:2:p:364-364
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00382.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Levent Kutlu & Robin C. Sickles, 2017. "Measuring market power when firms price discriminate," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 287-305, August.
    2. Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "Price discrimination in oligopoly with asymmetric firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(4), pages 2668-2670.
    3. Levent Kutlu, 2015. "Limited Memory Consumers and Price Dispersion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(4), pages 349-357, June.
    4. Bakó, Barna & Kálecz-Simon, András, 2012. "Price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 301-303.
    5. Devin Garcia & Levent Kutlu & Robin C. Sickles, 2022. "Market Structures in Production Economics," Springer Books, in: Subhash C. Ray & Robert G. Chambers & Subal C. Kumbhakar (ed.), Handbook of Production Economics, chapter 13, pages 537-574, Springer.
    6. Rajnish Kumar & Levent Kutlu, 2016. "Price Discrimination in Quantity Setting Oligopoly," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 84(4), pages 482-505, July.
    7. Levent Kutlu, 2017. "A conduct parameter model of price discrimination," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 64(5), pages 530-536, November.
    8. Hazledine, Tim, 2010. "Oligopoly price discrimination with many prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(3), pages 150-153, December.
    9. Yuen, Andrew Chi Lok & Lei, Zheng & Chow, Clement Kong Wing & Fung, Michael Ka Yiu, 2017. "Could market power explain hub premiums?," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(PA), pages 55-59.
    10. Kutlu, Levent, 2012. "Price discrimination in Cournot competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 540-543.

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