Does a Seller's Ecommerce Reputation Matter? Evidence from eBay Auctions
AbstractWith internet commerce, a buyer cannot directly examine the product and so must rely upon the accuracy and reliability of the seller in deciding whether and how much to bid. In this setting, the seller's reputation can become an important factor in the bid. This paper examines the impact of the seller's reputation on the willingness of buyers to bid on items sold via internet auctions, using a 1999 mint condition U.S. $5 gold coin whose average price was $32.73. The empirical results show that the seller's reputation has a positive, statistically significant, but small impact on the price. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Volume (Year): 50 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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