Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Compatibility and Bundling with Generalist and Specialist Firms

Contents:

Author Info

  • Denicolo, Vincenzo

Abstract

I analyze compatibility and bundling choices when one generalist firm offering both components of a system competes against two specialist firms each supplying one component only (but not the same one). I show that the generalist firm may have an incentive to choose incompatibility or engage in pure bundling when one component is less differentiated than the other. In this case, the system is more differentiated than the relatively undifferentiated component, and so under incompatibility the specialist firm that produces the undifferentiated component will relax price competition. This may result in higher profits for some of the competing firms. Copyright 2000 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=joie&volume=48&issue=2&year=2000&part=null
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.

Volume (Year): 48 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 177-88

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:48:y:2000:i:2:p:177-88

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Sue Mialon, 2009. "Product-bundling and Incentives for Merger and Strategic Alliance," Emory Economics 0907, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
  2. A. Mantovani & F. Ruiz-Aliseda, 2012. "Equilibrium Innovation Ecosystems: The Dark Side of Collaborating with Complementors," Working Papers wp825, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  3. A. Mantovani & J. Vandekerckhove, 2012. "The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in complementary markets," Working Papers wp814, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  4. Hurkens, Sjaak & Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2013. "Dominance and Competitive Bundling," IDEI Working Papers 790, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  5. Budzinski, Oliver & Wacker, Katharina, 2007. "The prohibition of the proposed Springer-ProSiebenSat.1-Merger: how much economics in German merger control?," IBES Diskussionsbeiträge 160, University of Duisburg-Essen, Faculty for Economics and Business Administration.
  6. Eugen Kovac, 2004. "Tying by a Non-monopolist," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp225, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  7. Sang-Hyun Kim & Jay Pil Choi, 2014. "Optimal Compatibility in Systems Markets," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 057, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  8. Matteo Alvisi & Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, 2011. "Separating complements: the effects of competition and quality leadership," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(2), pages 107-131, June.
  9. Reisinger, Markus, 2004. "The Effects of Product Bundling in Duopoly," Discussion Papers in Economics 477, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  10. A. Mantovani, 2010. "The strategic effect of bundling: a new perspective," Working Papers 705, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  11. Sandro Shelegia, 2008. "Pricing Interrelated Goods in Oligopoly," Working Papers 014-08, International School of Economics at TSU, Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia.
  12. SHIM, Sunghee & OH, Jungsuk, 2006. "Service Bundling and the Role of Access Charge in the Broadband Internet Service Market," MPRA Paper 3553, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Flores-Fillol, Ricardo & Moner Colonques, Rafael, 2010. "Endogenous Mergers of Complements with Mixed Bundling," Working Papers 2072/151551, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:48:y:2000:i:2:p:177-88. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.