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Advantageous Semi-collusion

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  • Brod, Andrew
  • Shivakumar, Ram
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    Abstract

    The textbook view that cartels increase industry profits and lower consumer welfare ignores the effects of competition in other activities. A revisionist view shows that, when cartel members compete in other activities, i.e., when they semicollude, the cartel members may be worse-off and consumers better-off. Using a two-stage model in which the nonproduction activity is R&D and is subject to technological spillovers, the authors show that both the traditional and revisionist views can be wrong, that consumers and producers can both be made worse-off, or both better-off, by a semicollusive production cartel. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.

    Volume (Year): 47 (1999)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 221-30

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:47:y:1999:i:2:p:221-30

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    Cited by:
    1. Pedro Gonzaga & António Brandão & Helder Vasconcelos, 2014. "Theory of Semi-Collusion in the Labor Market," FEP Working Papers 522, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    2. Konovalov, Alexander, 2014. "Competition and Cooperation in Network Games," Working Papers in Economics 583, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    3. Matsumura, Toshihiro & Matsushima, Noriaki & Cato, Susumu, 2013. "Competitiveness and R&D competition revisited," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 541-547.
    4. Ghosh, Arghya & Morita, Hodaka, 2012. "Competitor collaboration and product distinctiveness," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 137-152.
    5. Martzoukos, Spiros H & Zacharias, Eleftherios, 2008. "Real Option Games with R&D and Learning Spillovers," MPRA Paper 12686, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Pedro Cosme Costa Vieira, 2005. "Animals domestication and agriculture as outcomes of collusion," FEP Working Papers 164, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    7. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Advantageous or Disadvantageous Semi-collusion Licensing in a Vertically Separated Industry," Industrial Organization, EconWPA 0211006, EconWPA.
    8. Beladi, Hamid & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2012. "Footloose foreign firm and profitable domestic merger," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 186-194.

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