Preemptive Adoptions of an Emerging Technology
AbstractMany oligopolies exhibit continuing technological change and lumpy costs of adopting new technologies. If firms choose adoption dates in a game of timing and if the downstream market structure is a Bertrand duopoly, the equilibrium adoption pattern displays rent-dissipating increasing dominance, i.e., all adoptions are by the same firm, and the discounted value of profits is zero. These results need not hold for other market structures, including Cournot duopoly. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.
Volume (Year): 42 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821
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- A. Mahati & Rupayan Pal, 2013. "Competition, strategic delegation and delay in technology adoption," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2013-016, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
- Bergman, Mats A., 1998. "Endogenous Timing of Investments Yields Modified Stackelberg Outcomes," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 272, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Greenstein, Shane & Ramey, Garey, 1998. "Market structure, innovation and vertical product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 285-311, May.
- John Rust & Bertel Schjerning & Fedor Iskhakov, 2012. "A Dynamic Model of Leap-Frogging Investments and Bertrand Price Competition," 2012 Meeting Papers 370, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Fedor Iskhakov & John Rust & Bertel Schjerning, 2013. "The Dynamics of Bertrand Price Competition with Cost-Reducing Investments," Discussion Papers 13-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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