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What Does an Oligopoly Maximize?

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Author Info
Slade, Margaret E

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Abstract

A monopolist maximizes a well-defined objective function, monetary profit. In a competitive industry, although each individual pursues selfish objectives, the market behaves as if an agent was maximizing an objective function, social welfare. Can we say the same for an oligopoly? Do firms pursuing selfish objectives and behaving strategically act as if an agent was maximizing a 'fictitious' objective function? Necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash equilibria of static and state-space games to be observationally equivalent to single optimization problems are derived. Nash equilibria of the game that are not maxima of the function are shown to be generically unstable. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.

Volume (Year): 42 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 45-61
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:42:y:1994:i:1:p:45-61

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  1. D. Dragone & L. Lambertini & G. Leitmann & A. Palestini, 2008. "Hamiltonian potential functions for differential games," Working Papers 644, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  2. Norde, H. & Tijs, S., 1996. "Determinateness of strategic games with a potential," Research Memorandum 720, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  3. Branzei, R. & Mallozzi, L. & Tijs, S.H., 2001. "Supermodular games and potential games," Discussion Paper 97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. SOUBEYRAN, Antoine & WEBER, Shlomo, 2001. "District formation: a co-opetition approach," CORE Discussion Papers 2001016, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  5. Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1999. "Stochastic Game Theory: Adjustment to Equilibrium Under Noisy Directional Learning," Virginia Economics Online Papers 327, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Tercieux, Olivier & Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "The cutting power of preparation," Discussion Paper 94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Burkhard Schipper, 2002. "Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse29_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Robert Cairns, 2008. "Exhaustible Resources, Non-Convexity and Competitive Equilibrium," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(2), pages 177-193, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2008. "Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 469-490, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Facchini, G., 1995. "Congestion Models and Weighted Bayesian Potential Games," Research Memorandum 689, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  11. D. Dragone & L. Lambertini & A. Palestini, 2008. "A Class of Best-Response Potential Games," Working Papers 635, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  12. Hideo Konishi, 1999. "Concentration of Competing Retail Stores," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 447, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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