Cartel Stability in Sealed Bid Second Price Auctions
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.
Volume (Year): 36 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821
Other versions of this item:
- Thomas VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, 1988. "Cartel Stability in Sealed Bid Second Price Auctions," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP), UniversitÃ© de Lausanne, FacultÃ© des HEC, DEEP 8802, UniversitÃ© de Lausanne, FacultÃ© des HEC, DEEP.
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- Olga Gorelkina, 2014. "Precluding Collusion in the Vickrey Auction," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Heide Coenen & Manfred J. Holler & Esko Niskanen, 2000. "5th Helsinki Workshop on Standardization and Networks, 13-14 August, 2000," Discussion Papers, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT) 243, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
- J. Hinloopen, 2003. "Cartel Stability with Time-dependent Detection Probabilities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-104/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Hinloopen, Jeroen, 2006. "Internal cartel stability with time-dependent detection probabilities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1213-1229, November.
- Patrick Bajari & Garrett Summers, . "Detecting Collusion in Procurement Auctions: A Selective Survey of Recent Research," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics 01014, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
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