Tacit Collusion, Free Entry, and Welfare
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.
Volume (Year): 33 (1985)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821
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