Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Risky Debt Maturity Choice in a Sequential Game Equilibrium


Author Info

  • Kale, Jayant R
  • Noe, Thomas H


In this paper the choice of risky debt maturity structure is analyzed in a sequential game framework. The focus is on the set of viable equilibria when there are not transaction costs associated with the choice of debt maturity structure. It is shown that when changes in firm value are independent over time, both short- and long-term debt pooling are Nash sequential equilibrium outcomes. However, only the short-term debt pooling outcome satisfies the universal divinity refinements. Relaxing the assumption of independent changes in firm value, it is demonstrated that a separating equilibrium in which higher-quality firms issue short-term debt and low-quality firms issue long-term debt may exist. Furthermore, conditions exist under which long-term debt pooling is the universally divine outcome.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Southern Finance Association & Southwestern Finance Association in its journal Journal of Financial Research.

Volume (Year): 13 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 155-65

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:13:y:1990:i:2:p:155-65

Contact details of provider:
Web page:
More information through EDIRC

Web page:
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:

Related research



No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.


Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.


This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


Access and download statistics


When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:13:y:1990:i:2:p:155-65. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.