Do Bank Relationships Affect the Firm's Underwriter Choice in the Corporate-Bond Underwriting Market?
AbstractThis paper studies the effect of bank relationships on underwriter choice in the U.S. corporate-bond underwriting market following the 1989 commercial-bank entry. I find that bank relationships have positive and significant effects on a firm's underwriter choice, "over and above" their effects on fees. This result is sharply stronger for junk-bond issuers and first-time issuers. I also find that there is a significant fee discount when there are relationships between firms and commercial banks. Finally, I find that serving as arranger of past loan transactions has the strongest effect on underwriter choice, whereas serving merely as participant has no effect. Copyright 2005 by The American Finance Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.
Volume (Year): 60 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
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