Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions
AbstractBanks and related financial institutions often have two separate subsidiaries that make loans of similar type but differing risk, for example, a bank and a finance company, or a "good bank/bad bank" structure. Such "bipartite" structures may prevent risk shifting, in which banks misuse their flexibility in choosing and monitoring loans to exploit their debt holders. By "insulating" safer loans from riskier loans, a bipartite structure reduces risk-shifting incentives in the safer subsidiary. Bipartite structures are more likely to dominate unitary structures as the downside from riskier loans is higher or as expected profits from the efficient loan mix are lower. Copyright 2004 by The American Finance Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.
Volume (Year): 59 (2004)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
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- Charles M. Kahn & Andrew Winton, 2002. "Moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions," Proceedings 808, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
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