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Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short-term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly

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  • Douglas W. Diamond

Abstract

In legal systems with expensive or ineffective contract enforcement, it is difficult to induce lenders to enforce debt contracts. If lenders do not enforce, borrowers will have incentives to misbehave. Lenders have incentives to enforce given bad news when debt is short-term and subject to runs caused by externalities across lenders. Lenders will not undo these externalities by negotiation. The required number of lenders increases with enforcement costs. A very high enforcement cost can exceed the ex ante incentive benefit of enforcement. Removing lenders' right to immediately enforce their debt with a "bail-in" can improve the ex ante incentives of borrowers. Copyright 2004 by The American Finance Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.

Volume (Year): 59 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
Pages: 1447-1479

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:4:p:1447-1479

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Cited by:
  1. Claude Fluet & Paolo G. Garella, 2013. "Debt Rescheduling with Multiple Lenders: Relying on the Information of Others," Cahiers de recherche 1332, CIRPEE.
  2. Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 2009. "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority -super-1," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 879-902.
  3. Martin Strieborny & Madina Kukenova, 2011. "Investment in Relationship-Specific Assets: Does Finance Matter?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3349, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Viral V. Acharya & Douglas Gale & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2010. "Rollover Risk and Market Freezes," NBER Working Papers 15674, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Heitor Almeida & Murillo Campello & Bruno Laranjeira & Scott Weisbenner, 2009. "Corporate Debt Maturity and the Real Effects of the 2007 Credit Crisis," NBER Working Papers 14990, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Zheng, Xiaolan & El Ghoul, Sadok & Guedhami, Omrane & Kwok, Chuck C.Y., 2012. "National culture and corporate debt maturity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 468-488.
  7. Yunus Aksoy & Henrique S. Basso, 2012. "Liquidity, Term Spreads and Monetary Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3988, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Silvia Magri, 2006. "Debt maturity of Italian firms," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 574, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  9. Miyazawa, Shinjiro, 2012. "Optimal borrowing structure: An explanation for the multiplicity of large-share creditors and the differentiation among them," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 434-453.
  10. Acharya, Viral V & Viswanathan, S, 2008. "Moral Hazard, Collateral and Liquidity," CEPR Discussion Papers 6630, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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