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Asset Efficiency and Reallocation Decisions of Bankrupt Firms

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Author Info
Vojislav Maksimovic (University of Maryland Business School, College Park)
Gordon Phillips (University of Maryland Business School, College Park)

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Abstract

This paper investigates whether Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides a mechanism by which insolvent firms are efficiently reorganized and the assets of unproductive firms are effectively redeployed. We argue that incentives to reorganize depend on the level of demand and industry conditions. Using plant-level data, we find that Chapter 11 status is much less important than industry conditions in explaining the productivity, asset sales, and closure conditions of Chapter 11 bankrupt firms. This suggests that firms that elect to enter into Chapter 11 incur few real economic costs. Copyright The American Finance Association 1998.

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Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.

Volume (Year): 53 (1998)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
Pages: 1495-1532
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:5:p:1495-1532

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  1. Matthias Kahl, 2001. "Financial Distress as a Selection Mechanism: Evidence from the United States," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management 1017, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Vojislav Maksimovic & Gordon Phillips, 2006. "The Industry Life Cycle and Acquisitions and Investment: Does Firm Organization Matter?," NBER Working Papers 12297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Eckbo, B. Espen & Thorburn, Karin S., 2004. "Bidding in mandatory bankruptcy auctions: Theory and evidence," Discussion Papers 2004/16, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  4. Eckbo, B Espen & Thorburn, Karin S, 2005. "Bidding in Mandatory Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 4873, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Julie Hunsaker, 1999. "The role of debt and bankruptcy statutes in facilitating tacit collusion," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(1), pages 9-24.
  6. Per Stromberg, . "Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests," CRSP working papers 459, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Eckbo, B Espen & Thorburn, Karin S, 2002. "Control Benefits and CEO Discipline in Automatic Bankruptcy Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3481, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Gine, Xavier & Love, Inessa, 2006. "Do reorganization costs matter for efficiency ? Evidence from a bankruptcy reform in Colombia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3970, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Jianjun Miao, 2003. "Optimal Capital Structure and Industry Dynamics," Industrial Organization 0310001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Daniel M. Covitz & Song Han & Beth Anne Wilson, 2006. "Are longer bankruptcies really more costly?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2006-27, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  11. Eckbo, B Espen & Thorburn, Karin S, 2002. "Overbidding versus Fire-Sales in Bankruptcy Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3240, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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