The conventional view of going-private transactions is that they are designed to enhance the efficiency of the firm. A starkly different view is that these and other control transactions are motivated to effect transfers from other stakeholders in the firm to equity holders. This study exploits data describing pension terminations as a way to test these theories. The authors conclude that the efficiency theory can plausibly explain a substantial number of leveraged-buyout-related terminations, but not enough to undermine the transfer theory. More specific predictions from the efficiency theory are needed to structure more exacting tests. Copyright 1992 by American Finance Association.
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Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal Journal of Finance.
Volume (Year): 47 (1992) Issue (Month): 1 (March) Pages: 139-67 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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