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Determinants of Thrift Institution Resolution Costs

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Author Info
 Barth, James R
Bartholomew, Philip F
Bradley, Michael
Abstract

This paper provides a detailed examination of the cost imposed by thrift institutions resolved during the period 1980-88. A simple model is presented to explain the cost of resolution. This model is tested empirically with a comprehensive data set that permits us to avoid some of the econometric problems present in earlier studies. The empirical evidence suggests that the model that explains resolution costs in the late 1980s is significantly different from the model for either the middle or early 1980s. This evidence is consistent with the changing nature of the thrift crisis and changes in the regulator's closure rule. Our econometric evidence, moreover, is consistent with the hypothesis that, for troubled institutions, tangible net worth systematically understates market-value net worth. In addition, the importance of including time effects as well as institution effects as determinants of the cost of resolution is revealed. Copyright 1990 by American Finance Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal Journal of Finance.

Volume (Year): 45 (1990)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 731-54
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:45:y:1990:i:3:p:731-54

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  1. James Barth & Philip Bartholomew & Peter Elmer, 1997. "The value of tax benefits and the cost of liquidating versus selling failed thrift institutions," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 3-11, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. James B. Thomson, 1993. "The cost of buying time: lessons from the thrift debacle," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Jan 1. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ramon P. DeGennaro & Larry H. Lang & James B. Thomson, 1991. "Troubled savings and loan institutions: voluntary restructuring under insolvency," Working Paper 9112, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ramon P. DeGennaro & James B. Thomson, 1992. "Capital forbearance and thrifts: an ex post examination of regulatory gambling," Working Paper 9209, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Catherine M. Schrand & Haluk Unal, 1995. "Hedging and Coordinated Risk Management: Evidence from Thrift Conversions," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-05, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  6. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1994. "Underlying determinants of closed-bank resolution costs," Working Paper 9403, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kenneth A. Kim & S. Ghon Rhee, 2000. "A Note on Shareholoder Oversight and the Regulatory Environment: The Japanese Banking Experience," CEI Working Paper Series 2000-2, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  8. George P. Kaufman, 2004. "FDIC losses in bank failures: has FDICIA made a difference?," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q III, pages 13-25. [Downloadable!]
  9. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1997. "Depositor preference legislation and failed banks' resolution costs," Working Paper 9715, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
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