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A Double Moral Hazard Model of Organization Design

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  • Elazar Berkovitch
  • Ronen Israel
  • Yossi Spiegel

Abstract

We develop a theory of organization design in which the firm's structure is chosen by trading off ex post efficiency in the implementation of projects against ex ante efficiency in the selection of projects. Using our framework, we derive a novel set of empirical predictions regarding differences between firms with a functional structure and firms with a divisional structure. We examine how the overall profitability of the two structures is affected by various factors like size, complexity, and asymmetry in the importance of tasks and also explore the desirability of adopting a narrow business strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Elazar Berkovitch & Ronen Israel & Yossi Spiegel, 2010. "A Double Moral Hazard Model of Organization Design," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 55-85, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:1:p:55-85
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00245.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015. "Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(2), pages 153-176, March.
    2. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2015. "Merger efficiency and managerial incentives," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 51-63.
    3. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2014. "Merger Performance and Managerial Incentives," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 02/2014, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 108-117.
    5. Shin, Dongsoo, 2015. "Incentives and management styles," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 22-31.
    6. Piccolo, Salvatore & Tarantino, Emanuele & Ursino, Giovanni, 2015. "The value of transparency in multidivisional firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 9-18.
    7. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Bad Mergers Revisited: An Incentive Perspective," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79914, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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