Equal Pay for Unequal Work: Limiting Sabotage in Teams
Abstract"We demonstrate the value of "equal pay" policies in teams, even when team members have distinct abilities and make different contributions to team performance. A commitment to compensate all team members in identical fashion eliminates the incentive that each team member otherwise has to sabotage the activities of teammates in order to induce the team owner to implement a more favorable reward structure. The reduced sabotage benefits the team owner, and can secure Pareto gains under plausible circumstances." Copyright (c) 2010, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
Volume (Year): 19 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
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Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/
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- Debashis Pal & Arup Bose & David Sappington, 2008. "Equal Pay for Unequal Work: Limiting Sabotage in Teams," University of Cincinnati, Economics Working Papers Series 2008-07, University of Cincinnati, Department of Economics.
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- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Oliver Gurtler, 2013. "Sabotage in Contests: A Survey," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 051, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- J. Atsu Amegashie, 2013. "Sabotage in Contests: An Overview," CESifo Working Paper Series 4422, CESifo Group Munich.
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- Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Supervision in Firms," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12084, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00768900 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Optimal Organization," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 518-527.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2012. "Sabotage in teams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 289-292.
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