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Career Concerns: Incentives and Endogenous Learning in Labour Markets

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  • Borland, Jeff

Abstract

Models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity, and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm's owner. This survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns (hidden action and hidden information), and discusses some extensions of these models. Applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economic Surveys.

Volume (Year): 6 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 251-70

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:6:y:1992:i:3:p:251-70

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0950-0804

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Cited by:
  1. Alexander K. Koch & Eloic Peyrache, 2005. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/03, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Mar 2005.
  2. Simon Grant & Stephen King & Ben Polak, 1995. "Information Externalities, Share-Price Based Incentives and Managerial Behaviour," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1107, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Koch, Alexander K. & Morgenstern, Albrecht & Raab, Philippe, 2009. "Career concerns incentives: An experimental test," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 571-588, October.
  4. repec:iab:iabmit:v:33:i:4:p:594-608 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Beckmann, Michael, 2000. "Unternehmenspolitik, Managerkontrolle und Personalabbau in Deutschland : theoretische Ansätze und empirische Analyse mit Daten des IAB-Betriebspanels (Corporate policy, manager control and staff redu," Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 33(4), pages 594-608.
  6. Chevalier, J. & Ellison, G., 1996. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Working papers 96-3, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Bengt Holmstrom, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," NBER Working Papers 6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Alexander K. Koch & Albrecht Morgenstern & Philippe Raab, 2004. "An experimental test of career concerns," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse20_2004, University of Bonn, Germany.
  9. Frederiksen, Anders, 2010. "Earnings Progression, Human Capital and Incentives: Theory and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 4863, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloic, 2004. "Mixed Up? That's Good for Motivation," IZA Discussion Papers 1331, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  11. Effinger, Matthias R. & Polborn, Mattias K., 2001. "Herding and anti-herding: A model of reputational differentiation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 385-403, March.

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