Career Concerns: Incentives and Endogenous Learning in Labour Markets

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Career Concerns: Incentives and Endogenous Learning in Labour Markets

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Borland, Jeff

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Jeff Borland

Abstract

Models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity, and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm's owner. This survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns (hidden action and hidden information), and discusses some extensions of these models. Applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Economic Surveys.

Volume (Year): 6 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 251-70
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:6:y:1992:i:3:p:251-70

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Judith A. Chevalier & Glenn D. Ellison, 1995. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," NBER Working Papers 5234, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Chevalier, J. & Ellison, G., 1996. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Working papers 96-3, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
Koch, Alexander K. & Morgenstern, Albrecht & Raab, Philippe, 2004. "An Experimental Test of Career Concerns," IZA Discussion Papers 1405, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Alexander K. Koch & Albrecht Morgenstern & Philippe Raab, 2004. "An experimental test of career concerns," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/31, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Nov 2004. [Downloadable!]
- Alexander K. Koch & Albrecht Morgenstern & Philippe Raab, 2004. "An experimental test of career concerns," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse20_2004, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Alexander K. Koch & Eloic Peyrache, 2004. "Mixed up? That's good for motivation," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/22, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Sep 2004. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloic, 2004. "Mixed Up? That's Good for Motivation," IZA Discussion Papers 1331, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- Alexander Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2008. "Mixed up? that’s good for motivation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 107-125, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alexander K. Koch & Albrecht Morgenstern & Philippe Raab, 2009. "Career concerns incentives: An experimental test," Economics Working Papers 2009-01, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2008. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Economics Working Papers 2008-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloïc, 2005. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 1527, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- Alexander K. Koch & Eloic Peyrache, 2005. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/03, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
Simon Grant & Stephen King & Ben Polak, 1995. "Information Externalities, Share-Price Based Incentives and Managerial Behaviour," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1107, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Grant, Simon & King, Stephen & Polak, Ben, 1996. " Information Externalities, Share-Price Based Incentives and Managerial Behaviour," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, March.

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