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Farsighted Coalitional Stability Of A Price Leadership Cartel

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  • YOSHIO KAMIJO
  • SHIGEO MUTO

Abstract

This paper analyzes the farsighted behaviour of firms that form a dominant price leadership cartel. We consider stability concepts such as the farsighted core, the farsighted stable sets, and the largest consistent set. We show that: (i) the farsighted core is either an empty set or a singleton set of the grand cartel; (ii) any Pareto efficient cartel is itself a farsighted stable set; and (iii) the set of cartels in which fringe firms enjoy higher profits than the firms in the minimal Pareto efficient cartel is the largest consistent set.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoshio Kamijo & Shigeo Muto, 2010. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability Of A Price Leadership Cartel," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 455-465, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:61:y:2010:i:4:p:455-465
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2009.00499.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sylvie Thoron, 1998. "Formation of a Coalition-Proof Stable Cartel," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 63-76, February.
    2. Akihiro Suzuki & Shigeo Muto, 2005. "Farsighted Stability in an n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(3), pages 431-445, September.
    3. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    4. Prokop, Jacek, 1999. "Process of dominant-cartel formation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 241-257, February.
    5. John C. Harsanyi, 1974. "An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(11), pages 1472-1495, July.
    6. Page, Frank H., Jr. & Wooders, Myrna H., 2005. "Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Farsighted Core, and Network Formation Games," Economic Research Papers 269618, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    7. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2005. "Stable cartels revisited," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 907-921, November.
    8. Reinhard Selten, 1973. "A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 are Few and 6 are Many," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 008, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Toshiyuki Hirai, 2018. "Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1087-1111, November.
    2. Shino, Junnosuke & Kawasaki, Ryo, 2012. "Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling’s location games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 23-30.
    3. Yoshio Kamijo, 2013. "Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 339-357, September.
    4. Toshiyuki Hirai, 2017. "The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(1), pages 149-166, March.

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    Keywords

    C71 ; D43 ; L13 ;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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