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Uniqueness Of Equilibrium Payoffs In Finitely Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring

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  • TADASHI SEKIGUCHI

Abstract

This paper examines when a finitely repeated game with imperfect monitoring has a unique equilibrium payoff vector. This problem is nontrivial under imperfect monitoring, because uniqueness of equilibrium (outcome) in the stage game does not extend to finitely repeated games. A (correlated) equilibrium is equilibrium minimaxing if any player's equilibrium payoff is her minimax value when the other players choose a correlated action profile from the actions played in the equilibrium. The uniqueness result holds if all stage game correlated equilibria are equilibrium minimaxing and have the same payoffs. The uniqueness result does not hold under weaker conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2005. "Uniqueness Of Equilibrium Payoffs In Finitely Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(3), pages 317-331, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:56:y:2005:i:3:p:317-331
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00330.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2018. "Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 58-87.
    2. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.

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