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A Single EU Seat in the IMF?

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  • Lorenzo Bini Smaghi
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    Abstract

    This article examines the rationale for consolidating EU Member States' position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although a substantial amount of co-ordination already takes place, particularly on issues related to the euro area and the single monetary and exchange rate policy, co-operation between EU countries in the IMF remains a relatively new phenomenon and divergences still prevail. The current institutional set-up, whereby the 15 EU countries are spread in nine constituencies, undermines effectiveness. Al though there is scope for further improving co-operation, there are natural limits to what can be achieved within the existing co-operation frame work. A single EU constituency would enable EU Member States to have a strong impact on IMF policies, potentially as strong as that of the US. However, this may not be an objective for all EU countries in the current conjuncture. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Common Market Studies.

    Volume (Year): 42 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 2 (06)
    Pages: 229-248

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:42:y:2004:i:2:p:229-248

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    Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0021-9886

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    Cited by:
    1. Loeper, Antoine, 2011. "Coordination in heterogeneous federal systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 900-912.
    2. Mario Sarcinelli, 2004. "The new financial architecture: from substantive to procedural rules," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 57(231), pages 337-363.
    3. Leech, Dennis & Leech, Robert, 2009. "Reforming IMF and World Bank governance : in search of simplicity, transparency and democratic legitimacy in the voting rules," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 914, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. Mario Sarcinelli, 2004. "The new financial architecture: from substantive to procedural rules," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 57(231), pages 337-363.
    5. Leech, Dennis & Leech, Robert, 2005. "Voting Power Implications of a Unified European Representation at the IMF," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 720, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

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