Voting in EMU - An Experimental Study of Institutional Innovation and the Role of Communication in the Stability and Growth Pact
AbstractThe Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in the EU's economic and monetary union (EMU) aims to assure sound public finances in the EMU Member States by providing for sanctions against countries with excessive deficits. We experimentally examine the voting procedure of the SGP and find that the institutional rules are not at all satisfactory. As an institutional innovation, we test a procedure where fiscal sinners are excluded from voting, as suggested by Otmar Issing. It turns out that this modification is surprisingly successful. In addition, our study shows that the opportunity to communicate has a significant impact and tends to mitigate the Pact's shortcomings. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Common Market Studies.
Volume (Year): 41 (2003)
Issue (Month): (09)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0021-9886
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- Bertrand Crettez & RÃ©gis Deloche, 2006. "On the unification of legal rules in the European Union," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 203-214, May.
- Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter, 2006. "An experimental analysis of voting in the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Monetary Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 417-434, December.
- Corinna Ahlfeld, 2010. "Reputation Sells -Compensation Payments in the Political Sphere," Departmental Discussion Papers 145, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
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