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Board Share-Ownership and Takeover Performance

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Author Info
Andy Cosh
Paul M. Guest
Alan Hughes
Abstract

We investigate the relation between takeover performance and board share-ownership in the acquiring company for a sample of 363 UK takeovers completed in the period 1985-96. In investigating this relationship we pay particular attention to the composition of board shareholdings as well as their size. Thus, in addition to the analysis of total board holdings, we analyse the separate impact of CEO shareholdings and of the pattern of non-executive and executive holdings within the board. In addition to our detailed examination of board holdings we assess the impact of non-board holdings. Our analysis controls for a number of non-shareholding constraints on discretionary director behaviour and for a variety of other influences on takeover outcomes including: the means of payment; acquirer size and market to book value; the relative size of the acquirer and the target; the nature of the bid in terms of hostility and industrial direction; and the pre-takeover performance of the acquiring company. We assess performance in terms of announcement returns, long run share returns and a portfolio of accounting measures. We find evidence that overall board ownership has a strong positive impact on long run share returns and a weak positive impact on operating performance. However, much stronger effects are found when the overall board measure is split into CEO, executive, and non-executive directors. We find strong evidence of a positive relation between takeover performance and CEO ownership, which holds for both long run returns and operating performance measures. This finding is robust to controlling for other factors that determine takeover performance and holds in a two stage least squares framework that controls for endogeneity effects. Shareholdings of other executive directors, non-executive directors, and non-board holdings are found to have no significant effect on takeover performance. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2006.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2006.00615.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Business Finance & Accounting.

Volume (Year): 33 (2006-04)
Issue (Month): 3-4 ()
Pages: 459-510
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:33:y:2006-04:i:3-4:p:459-510

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0306-686X

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  1. Andy Cosh & Alan Hughes, 2008. "Takeovers after "Takeovers"," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp363, ESRC Centre for Business Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Andy Cosh & Paul Guest & Alan Hughes, 2007. "UK Corporate Governance and Takeover Performance," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp357, ESRC Centre for Business Research. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-19.


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