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Convertible Securities and Bankruptcy Reforms: Addressing Too Big to Fail and Reducing the Fragility of the Financial System

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  • Charles I. Plosser

Abstract

Eliminating too big to fail should be the first priority of any regulatory reform. But this is easier said than done. As the crisis has taught us, when the systemic risks are perceived to be large, regulators will be very reluctant to close down insolvent firms or impose losses on creditors. So how do we reduce these risks so that regulators can credibly commit to a policy of allowing financial companies to fail and not resort to rescues or bailouts? The author proposes two complementary approaches to this problem: The first is to design capital structures with corrective mechanisms that kick in when a financial firm displays signs of trouble, but still has positive economic capital. To this end, the author endorses the Squam Lake Report's proposal that encourages financial firms to issue convertible debt with an “automatic” provision for converting to equity. In contrast to the Squam Lake proposal, however, the author argues that the conversion to equity should not depend on regulators' decisions and should take place before individual banks and the financial system are in full crisis mode. The second approach is to design a resolution mechanism that will close failing financial firms when early intervention has not led to the firm's recovery. The author argues that the best model for this mechanism is bankruptcy, because of its resolution of claims according to predetermined rules rather than regulatory discretion. However, certain forms of early intervention can also help to lower the costs of permitting firms to fail. For example, the Squam Lake idea that financial institutions be required to develop living wills should make it easier to unwind these firms in an orderly fashion and provide regulators with insight into the degree of systemic risk that these firms impose. The author notes that the challenges associated with getting the executives of healthy banks to plan for their own bankruptcy may indicate that a better use of regulatory resources might be to view the living will as one of the tools of prompt corrective action for firms that become undercapitalized but are still solvent. Once a firm has been declared undercapitalized, regulators would have greater bargaining power to insist on a serious plan for bankruptcy.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles I. Plosser, 2010. "Convertible Securities and Bankruptcy Reforms: Addressing Too Big to Fail and Reducing the Fragility of the Financial System," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(3), pages 30-33, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jacrfn:v:22:y:2010:i:3:p:30-33
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-6622.2010.00286.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2012. "Contingent capital: the trigger problem," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 98(1Q), pages 33-50.
    2. Bernd Rudolph, 2013. "Contingent Convertibles (CoCo-Bonds) als Bail-in-Instrumente für Banken," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 65(67), pages 97-122, January.
    3. Douglas Davis & Oleg Korenok & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2014. "An Experimental Analysis of Contingent Capital with Market‐Price Triggers," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(5), pages 999-1033, August.
    4. repec:fip:fedreq:y:2012:i:1q:p:33-50:n:vol.98no.1 is not listed on IDEAS

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