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Lessons from the Russian Meltdown: The Economics of Soft Legal Constraints

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Perotti, Enrico

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Abstract

On 17 August 1998, Russia abandoned its exchange rate regime, defaulted on its domestic public debt and declared a moratorium on all private foreign liabilities, which was equivalent to an outright default. The depth and speed of the Russian meltdown shocked the international markets, and precipitated a period of serious financial instability. Important lessons on issues of bank supervision and international stability can be learned by understanding the roots of such a crisis. The visible reason of the crisis was an unsustainable fiscal deficit coupled with massive capital flight, but what were their underlying causes? We argue that the structure of individual incentives in a context of capture of state decisions by special interests, compounded by a ruble overvaluation driven by exceptional international support, helps to explain the build-up of non-payment, theft and capital flight that led to the crisis. We offer an explicit model of rational collective non-compliance, cash stripping and rational collective non-payment which led to the fiscal and banking crisis and, ultimately, to a complete meltdown. In our view, the banking sector was already insolvent prior to the crisis, and contributed directly and indirectly to it. We conclude with a radical policy proposal for a stable banking system for Russia, appropriate for its current capacity for legal and supervisory enforcement. It is based on a segmented, narrow banking sector, concentration in commercial banking and a cautious extension of deposit insurance. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal International Finance.

Volume (Year): 5 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (Winter)
Pages: 359-99
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Handle: RePEc:bla:intfin:v:5:y:2002:i:3:p:359-99

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dalia Marin & Monika Schnitzer, 2000. "Disorganization and Financial Collapse," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Katharina Pistor & Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, 2000. "Law and Finance in Transition Economies," CID Working Papers 49, Center for International Development at Harvard University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Enrico Perotti & Paolo Volpin, 2007. "Investor Protection and Entry," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-006/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  4. Katharina Pistor & Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, 2000. "Law and Finance in Transition Economies," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(2), pages 325-368, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Franco Modigliani & Enrico Perotti, 2000. "Security Markets versus Bank Finance: Legal Enforcement and Investors' Protection," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 1(2), pages 81-96. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Berglof, Erik & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Soft Budget Constraints and Banking in Transition Economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 18-40, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. A. Karas & W. Pyle & K. Schoors, 2007. "Sophisticated Discipline in a Nascent Deposit Market: Evidence from Post-Communist Russia," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 07/450, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Berglof, Erik & Claessens, Stijn, 2004. "Enforcement and Corporate Governance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3409, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Dalia Marin & Haizhou Huang & Chenggang Xu, 2004. "Financial Crisis, Economic Recovery and Banking Development in Russia, Ukraine, and Other FSU Countries," IMF Working Papers 04/105, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ruys, Pieter H.M., 2005. "The governance of services," Discussion Paper 102, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Haizhou Huang & Dalia Marin & Chenggang Xu, 2003. "Financial Crisis, Economic Recovery and Banking Development in Former Soviet Union Economies," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Ruys, P.H.M. & Bruil, J. & Dix, H.G., 2007. "Modes of Governance in the Dutch Social Housing Sector," Discussion Paper 2007-001, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
  8. Abdur Chowdhury, 2003. "Banking Reform In Russia: A Window Of Opportunity?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-601, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ruys, P.H.M., 2005. "The governance of services," Discussion Paper 24, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
  10. Perotti, Enrico, 2004. "State ownership - a residual role?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3407, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  11. Andryakov Alexander & Gurvich Evsey, 2002. "A Model of the Russian Crisis Development," EERC Working Paper Series 02-03e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS. [Downloadable!]
  12. Abdur Chowdhury, 2003. "Banking reform in russia: winds of change?," Journal of Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 6(2), pages 89-103, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Haizhou Huang & Dalia Marin & Chenggang Xu, 2004. "Financial Crisis, Economic Recovery, and Banking Development in Russia, and other FSU Countries," Discussion Papers 79, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  14. S. CLAEYS & G. LANINE & K. SCHOORs, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/307, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  15. Enrico Perotti & Paolo Volpin, 2007. "Investor Protection and Entry," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-006/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  16. Kares, Alexei & Schoors , Koen & Lanine, Gleb, 2008. "Liquidity matters: Evidence from the Russian interbank market," BOFIT Discussion Papers 19/2008, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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