Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Monetary Policy Design: Institutional Developments from a Contractual Perspective

Contents:

Author Info

  • Walsh, Carl E

Abstract

Twenty years ago, most industrialized economies were just starting the costly process of disinflation. There was little consensus that these disinflations would be successful, or that low inflation once achieved could be maintained. While the USA achieved low inflation without changing its policy-making institutions, many other countries did reform their central banking institutions, making them more independent of political influences. In this paper, I address three questions. First, is independence enough? Second, how do the details of an institution's structure translate, through their impact on incentives, into different policy outcomes? And third, can institutions serve as commitment mechanisms? Copyright 2000 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=infi&volume=3&issue=3&year=2000&part=null
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal International Finance.

Volume (Year): 3 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 375-89

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:intfin:v:3:y:2000:i:3:p:375-89

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1367-0271

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1367-0271

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Franck, Raphaƫl & Krausz, Miriam, 2008. "Why separate monetary policy from banking supervision?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 388-411, September.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:intfin:v:3:y:2000:i:3:p:375-89. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.