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Central Bank Independence and Credibility: Is There a Shred of Evidence?: Review Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Forder, James
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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal International Finance .
Volume (Year): 3 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 167-85
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Handle: RePEc:bla:intfin:v:3:y:2000:i:1:p:167-85Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1367-0271
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Linda S. Goldberg & Michael W. Klein, 2007.
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Other versions:
Linda S. Goldberg & Michael W. Klein, 2005.
"Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank ,"
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11792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Linda S. Goldberg & Michael W. Klein, 2005.
"Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank ,"
The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series
iiisdp105, IIIS.
[Downloadable!] Linda S. Goldberg & Michael W. Klein, 2005.
"Establishing credibility: evolving perceptions of the European Central Bank ,"
Staff Reports
231, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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