IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ijethy/v2y2006i3-4p365-383.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Endogenous price leadership and technological differences

Author

Listed:
  • Makoto Yano
  • Takashi Komatsubara

Abstract

This study constructs a two‐stage game of price leadership in a duopolistic market for a homogeneous product. In the first period, the two firms determine a price leader; they set a price for the product in the second period. It is demonstrated in the present study that the technologically superior firm tends to become a price leader. This result reveals that price leadership is determined by the interaction of “competitive force”, which prevents the price leader from choosing too high a price (like the joint profit maximizing price or the cartel price), and “collusive force”, which prevents a price from falling to a Bertrand price.

Suggested Citation

  • Makoto Yano & Takashi Komatsubara, 2006. "Endogenous price leadership and technological differences," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 2(3‐4), pages 365-383, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:2:y:2006:i:3-4:p:365-383
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2006.0041.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2006.0041.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2006.0041.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Attila Tasnádi, 2016. "Endogenous timing of moves in Bertrand–Edgeworth triopolies," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 317-334, December.
    2. Daisuke Hirata & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2011. "Price leadership in a homogeneous product market," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 104(3), pages 199-217, November.
    3. Torsten J. Gerpott & Jan Berends, 2022. "Competitive pricing on online markets: a literature review," Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(6), pages 596-622, December.
    4. Niu, Baozhuang & Wang, Yulan & Guo, Pengfei, 2015. "Equilibrium pricing sequence in a co-opetitive supply chain with the ODM as a downstream rival of its OEM," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 57(PB), pages 249-270.
    5. Makoto Yano, 2009. "The Foundation Of Market Quality Economics," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(1), pages 1-32, March.
    6. Gustavo Gudino, 2021. "Self-Enforcing Price Leadership," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-18, July.
    7. Makoto Yano & Takashi Komatsubara, 2018. "Price competition or price leadership," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(4), pages 1023-1057, December.
    8. José Luis Ferreira & Roberts Waddle, 2010. "Strategic profit sharing between firms," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 6(4), pages 341-354, December.
    9. Oksana Loginova, 2010. "Brand familiarity and product knowledge in customization," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 6(3), pages 297-309, September.
    10. Takashi Komatsubara, 2008. "Equilibrium Selection In The Yano Model Of Price Leadership," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(5), pages 649-655, December.
    11. Rui Ota & Hiroshi Fujiu, 2021. "Price Competition and Setup Cost," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-15, February.
    12. Luciano Fanti, 2016. "Endogenous timing under price competition and unions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 401-413, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:2:y:2006:i:3-4:p:365-383. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1742-7355 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.