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The Impact of Payoff Interdependence on Trust and Trustworthiness

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Author Info
Werner Güth
M. Vittoria Levati
Matteo Ploner

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Abstract

In one-shot investment games where each player's payoff is a convex combination of own and other's profit, we measure trust by the amount given to the trustee and trustworthiness by the amount returned to the trustor by the trustee. Does the degree of payoff interdependence increase both trust and trustworthiness or one but not the other or neither of them? According to our experimental data, trust remains unaffected by the extent of interdependence whereas trustworthiness reacts positively to it. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2008.00424.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal German Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 9 (2008)
Issue (Month): (02)
Pages: 87-95
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Handle: RePEc:bla:germec:v:9:y:2008:i::p:87-95

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  1. Cox, James C., 2004. "How to identify trust and reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 260-281, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Werner Güth & Matteo Ploner & Vittoria Levati, . "The Effect of Group Identity in an Investment Game," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-06, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gneezy, Uri & Guth, Werner & Verboven, Frank, 2000. "Presents or investments? An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 481-493, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Harvey James, 2002. "The Trust Paradox: A Survey of Economic Inquiries Into the Nature of Trust and Trustworthiness," Microeconomics 0202001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. James Jr., Harvey S., 2002. "The trust paradox: a survey of economic inquiries into the nature of trust and trustworthiness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 291-307, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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