Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power
AbstractWe introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal-agent (P-A) framework by varying the agent's outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent's bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the P-A model and in the alternating offer game. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Verein für Socialpolitik in its journal German Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 7 (2006)
Issue (Month): (November)
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