Investor Protections and Concentrated Ownership: Assessing Corporate Control Mechanisms in the Netherlands
AbstractThe Berle-Means problem - information and incentive asymmetries disrupting relations between knowledgeable managers and remote investors - has remained a durable issue engaging researchers since the 1930s. However, the Berle-Means paradigm - widely dispersed, helpless investors facing strong, entrenched managers - is under stress in the wake of the cross-country evidence presented by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, and their legal approach to corporate control. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Verein für Socialpolitik in its journal German Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 5 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
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Other versions of this item:
- Robert S. Chirinko & Hans van Ees & Harry Garretsen & Elmer Sterken, 2003. "Investor Protections and Concentrated Ownership: Assessing Corporate Control Mechanisms in the Netherlands," CESifo Working Paper Series 864, CESifo Group Munich.
- Robert Chirinko & Hans van Ees & Harry Garretsen & Elmer Sterken, 2002. "Investor Protections and Concentrated Ownership: Assessing Corporate Control Mechanisms in the Netherlands," Emory Economics 0213, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
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