Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Competition Necessarily Tends to Produce Excess: The Experience of Free Banking in Switzerland

Contents:

Author Info

  • Manfred Neldner
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    According to McCulloch, Longfield and Loyd, a free banking system is always prone to overissues of bank notes. Their view is supported by the free banking era in Switzerland (1826-1907), where, due to competitive pressures within the banking community and the absence of note-brand loyalty on the part of the general public, overissues (causing a rise in the foreign exchange rates above the upper gold and silver points) finally became permanent. Free competition, therefore, had to give way to collusive action and, in 1907 (with the open consent of the issuing banks), to the establishment of the Swiss National Bank. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=geer&volume=4&issue=&year=2003&part=null
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Verein für Socialpolitik in its journal German Economic Review.

    Volume (Year): 4 (2003)
    Issue (Month): (08)
    Pages: 389-408

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:bla:germec:v:4:y:2003:i::p:389-408

    Contact details of provider:
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1465-6485
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1465-6485

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Frankel, Jeffrey A, 1979. "On the Mark: A Theory of Floating Exchange Rates Based on Real Interest Differentials," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 610-22, September.
    2. Friedman, Milton & Schwartz, Anna J., 1986. "Has government any role in money?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 37-62, January.
    3. George A. Selgin & Lawrence H. White, 1994. "How Would the Invisible Hand Handle Money?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1718-1749, December.
    4. Selgin, George, 1994. "Free Banking and Monetary Control," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1449-59, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Alexander Fink, 2014. "Free banking as an evolving system: The case of Switzerland reconsidered," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 57-69, March.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:germec:v:4:y:2003:i::p:389-408. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.