The Success of Currency Reforms to End Great Inflations: An Empirical Analysis of 34 High Inflations
AbstractThe estimation of an ordered probit model for currency reforms attempting to end 31 hyperinflations and three huge inflations of the twentieth century shows that the introduction of an independent central bank and the adoption of a credibly fixed exchange rate are crucial for the success of a currency reform. In addition, currency reforms are demonstrated to be more difficult in centrally planned economies than in market economies. Copyright 2009 The Authors. Journal Compilation 2009 Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Verein für Socialpolitik in its journal German Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 10 (2009)
Issue (Month): (05)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1465-6485
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gomis-Porqueras, Pere & Haro, Alex, 2007.
"Global bifurcations, credit rationing and recurrent hyperinflations,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 473-491, February.
- Pere Gomis-Porqueras & Àlex Haro, 2005. "Global Bifurcations, Credit Rationing and Recurrent Hyperinflations," Working Papers 239, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Paldam, Martin, 1994.
"The political economy of stopping high inflation,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 135-168, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.