Illegal Insider Trading: Is It Rampant before Corporate Takeovers?
AbstractThis paper investigates the role of insider trading as an explanati on for the observed preannouncement price run-ups for takeover targets. The authors hypothesize that if insider trading is a significant cont ributor to such price run-ups, then observed run-ups should be small for takeovers occurring after May 1986 (the beginning of the "insider trading scandal" ) relative to those occurring prior to May 1986. The evidence suggests that insider trading is not, on average, a significant contributor to preannouncement price run-ups. Copyright 1988 by MIT Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Eastern Finance Association in its journal The Financial Review.
Volume (Year): 23 (1988)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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- Nadia Linciano, 2003. "The Effectiveness of Insider Trading Regulation in Italy. Evidence from Stock-Price Run-Ups Around Announcements of Corporate Control Transactions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 199-218, September.
- Dan Jordan & Donald Wort, 2009. "A test of bear market mergerstat control premiums," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 27-36, July.
- Anderson, Hamish D. & Rose, Lawrence C. & Cahan, Steven F., 2006. "Differential shareholder wealth and volume effects surrounding private equity placements in New Zealand," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 367-394, September.
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