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Post-crisis challenges to bank regulation

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  • Xavier Freixas

Abstract

"The current crisis has totally transfigured the world's financial landscape. The lessons we have derived have also transformed our perception of banking risks, contagion and its implication for banking regulation. It is now well established that risks were mispriced, accumulated in neuralgic points of the financial system, were amplified by procyclical regulation and the instability and fragility of financial institutions. Yet the implications on the design of post-crisis banking regulation are unclear. In this article we summarize the key issues the new regulatory framework have to consider and how they relate to one another. As the debate over the new financial regulation architecture has evolved, two different views seem to emerge: one views banking crises as an unavoidable phenomenon, so that regulation should provide a framework to cope with its impact. The other considers that crisis could be avoided provided banking regulation is duly modified. We argue that for consistency reasons choosing one view or the other leads to a completely different perspective on the future of banking regulation, as it implies a different view on the banking industry, bank stakeholders' rights, banks' corporate governance and contagion. As a consequence, choosing the incorrect view of banking crises may lead to an inefficient banking industry." Copyright (c) CEPR, CES, MSH, 2010.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by CEPR & CES & MSH in its journal Economic Policy.

Volume (Year): 25 (2010)
Issue (Month): (04)
Pages: 375-399

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Handle: RePEc:bla:ecpoli:v:25:y:2010:i::p:375-399

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Cited by:
  1. Tamgac, Unay, 2011. "Crisis and self-fulfilling expectations: The Turkish experience in 1994 and 2000-2001," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 44-58, January.
  2. Crafts, Nicholas & Fearon, Peter, 2010. "Lessons from the 1930s' Great Depression," CEPR Discussion Papers 8057, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Haucap, Justus & Heimeshoff, Ulrich & Uhde, André, 2010. "Zur Neuregulierung des Bankensektors nach der Finanzkrise: Bewertung der Reformvorhaben der EU aus ordnungspolitischer Sicht," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 02, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

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