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More power to the European Parliament?

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Author Info
Abdul G. Noury
Gérard Roland

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Abstract

Many observers have expressed scepticism about granting more power to the European Parliament. The sceptics believe that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) do not vote in a disciplined way and that they vote more often with their country group than with their European Party. Using a unique database consisting of all roll call votes by each individual MEP between 1989 and 1999 (over 6000 votes by over 1000 different MEPs), we show that the sceptics are wrong. Our data shows clearly that MEPs vote more along party lines than along country lines. Party cohesion is comparable to that of the US Congress and is increasing over time whereas country cohesion is low and declining. In short, politics in the European Parliament generally follows the traditional left-right divide that one finds in all European nations. These findings are valid across issues, even on issues like the structural and cohesion funds where one would expect country rather than party cohesion. In votes where the EP has the most power - those held under the so-called co-decision procedure - MEPs participate more and are more party-cohesive. In our opinion, this unique empirical analysis provides grounds for justifying a generalization of the co-decision procedure. Copyright (c) CEPR, CES, MSH, 2002.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0327.t01-1-00090
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Publisher Info
Article provided by CEPR, CES, MSH in its journal Economic Policy.

Volume (Year): 17 (2002)
Issue (Month): 35 (October)
Pages: 279-319
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:ecpoli:v:17:y:2002:i:35:p:279-319

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  1. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgren, 2004. "The Inter-institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Discussion Papers 944, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Abdul Noury, 2004. "Abstention in Daylight: Strategic Calculus of Voting in the European Parliament," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 179-211, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Francisco Torres, 2003. "How efficient is Joint Decision-Making in the EU? Environmental Policies and the Co-Decision Procedure," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 05, Departamento de Economia, Gestão e Engenharia Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro. [Downloadable!]
  4. Roland, Gerard, 2003. "New governance of Europe: Parliamentary or presidential?, The," IESE Research Papers D/503, IESE Business School. [Downloadable!]
  5. Francisco Torres, 2003. "How efficient is joint decision-making in the EU?," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 38(6), pages 312-322, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Heikki Kauppi & Mika Widgrén, 2008. "Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room in Explaining EU Budget Receipts?," Discussion Papers 38, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Heikki Kauppi & Mika Widgrén, 2008. "Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room Explaining EU Bydget Receipts?," Discussion Papers 1161, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  8. Vaubel, Roland, 2003. "Principal-Agent-Probleme in Internationalen Organisationen," Discussion Paper Series 26392, Hamburg Institute of International Economics. [Downloadable!]
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