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International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality

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  • Olivier Jeanne
  • Jeromin Zettelmeyer

Abstract

The large international bailouts of the 1990s have been criticized for generating moral hazard at the expense of the global taxpayer. We argue that this criticism is misleading because international bailouts create no, or very few, costs to the international community. Instead, the problem is to ensure that bailouts are not used to facilitate bad domestic policies, thus creating moral hazard at the expense of domestic taxpayers. This may require a shift towards ex ante conditionality, in the sense that the availability and size of official crisis lending need to be conditional on government policies before the crisis. Copyright CEPR, CES, MSH, 2001.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by CEPR & CES & MSH in its journal Economic Policy.

Volume (Year): 16 (2001)
Issue (Month): 33 (October)
Pages: 407-432

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Handle: RePEc:bla:ecpoli:v:16:y:2001:i:33:p:407-432

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References

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  1. Allan H. Meltzer, 1998. "Asian Problems and the IMF," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), pages 264-274, Winter.
  2. Morris Goldstein, 2000. "Strengthening the International Financial Architecture: Where Do We Stand?," Working Paper Series WP00-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
  3. Eric Friedman & Simon Johnson & Peter Boone & Alasdair Breach, 1999. "Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis," Departmental Working Papers 199920, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  4. Lynn Aylward & Rupert Thorne, 1998. "An Econometric Analysis of Countries' Repayment Performance to the International Monetary Fund," IMF Working Papers 98/32, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Isabel Schnabel, 2002. "Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending: A Test," IMF Working Papers 02/181, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "Local Corruption and Global Capital Flows," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 31(2), pages 303-354.
  7. Thomas Romer & Barry R. Weingast, 1991. "Political Foundations of the Thrift Debacle," NBER Chapters, in: Politics and Economics in the Eighties, pages 175-214 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Alberto Alesina & Geoffrey Carliner, 1991. "Politics and Economics in the Eighties," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number ales91-1.
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