How should society deal with risks when there is scientific uncertainty about the size of these risks? There has been much recent discussion of the Precautionary Principle, which states that lack of full scientific knowledge should not be used as a reason to postpone cost-effective preventive measures. We show in this paper that the Precautionary Principle contradicts one important intuition about the right way to act in the face of risk, namely the principle of 'looking before you leap'. When we expect to learn more about the future, the effectiveness of our preventive measures will be greater if we learn before we act. However, a number of other ways of taking uncertainty into account are consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the Precautionary Principle. First, postponing preventive measures may increase our vulnerability to damage, which induces a precautionary motive for risk-prevention, similar to the precautionary savings motive. Secondly, stronger preventive actions often yield more flexibility for the future, so that acting early has an option value. Thirdly, when better information comes from a process of learning-by-doing, the risk associated with early events is amplified by the information they yield about the future. This plays a role analogous to that of an increase in risk aversion, making us more cautious. Fourthly, because imperfect knowledge of the risk makes it difficult to insure, the social cost of risk should include a risk premium. Finally, uncertainty about the economic environment enjoyed by future generations should be taken into account. This raises the benefit of acting early to prevent long-term risks. Copyright CEPR, CES, MSH, 2001.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Article provided by CEPR, CES, MSH in its journal Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 16 (2001) Issue (Month): 33 (October) Pages: 301-328 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Summers, Lawrence & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2008.
"Policymaking for Posterity,"
Working Paper Series
rwp08-040, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: