Separation of railway infrastructure, a natural monopoly, from a contestable train operator industry raises policy options for setting the infrastructure access fee and for regulation of the infrastructure supplier. Marginal cost, average cost, Ramsey prices, and multipart tariff rules for access fees are assessed. Recognizing the importance of train operator entry decisions, a single access fee per gross ton kilometer based on a mark-up of marginal cost is favored. An independent regulator and the use of price ceilings on the infrastructure supplier are proposed. Copyright 1998 by The Economic Society of Australia.
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Article provided by The Economic Society of Australia in its journal The Economic Record.
Volume (Year): 74 (1998) Issue (Month): 226 (September) Pages: 286-96 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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