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Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Size in Australia

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  • Grossman, Philip J

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental collusion, and the resulting fiscal dependence, on the size of the public sector in Australia. Contrary to evidence for the United States, fiscal decentralization is found to have no impact on public sector size in Australia. Three possible explanations for this finding were suggested: the relatively small number of lower-level governments; the economic insignificance of local governments; and the relative immobility of citizens. Fiscal dependence of state governments on the Commonwealth proves a significant determinant of public sector size, consistent with findings for the United States. Copyright 1992 by The Economic Society of Australia.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The Economic Society of Australia in its journal The Economic Record.

Volume (Year): 68 (1992)
Issue (Month): 202 (September)
Pages: 240-46

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Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:68:y:1992:i:202:p:240-46

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Cited by:
  1. Philip Bodman & Harry Campbell & Kelly-Ana Heaton & Andrew Hodge, . "Fiscal Decentralisation, Macroeconomic Conditions and Economic Growth in Australia," MRG Discussion Paper Series 2609, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  2. Zhu, Z. & Krug, B., 2005. "Is China a Leviathan?," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2004-103-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni.
  3. John Anderson & Hendrik van den Berg, 1998. "Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size: An International Test for Leviathan Accounting for Unmeasured Economic Activity," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 171-186, May.
  4. Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 205-256, January.
  5. Ehdaie, Jaber, 1994. "Fiscal decentralization and the size of the government : an extension with evidence from cross-country data," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1387, The World Bank.
  6. Göbel, Jürgen, 2009. "How can the power of Leviathans be measured?," MPRA Paper 13789, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Fox, William F. & Gurley, Tami, 2006. "Will consolidation improve sub-national governments ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3913, The World Bank.
  8. Pitlik, Hans & Schmid, Gunther & Strotmann, Harald, 2001. " Bargaining Power of Smaller States in Germany's Landerfinanzausgleich 1979-90," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 109(1-2), pages 183-201, October.

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