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Dimensional Simplification And Economic Theories Of Legislative Behavior

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  • Keith T. Poole
  • Howard Rosenthal

Abstract

In many many places, the political parties and political contests seem to array themselves along a single dimension. If you look at their programs in detail it always turns out that it's much more complicated than that. But it would appear that in the minds of the voters they are literally frequently arrayed on a single continuum which, as a result of the organization of the French chamber of deputies, is usually referred to as a left/right.

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  • Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, 1994. "Dimensional Simplification And Economic Theories Of Legislative Behavior," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 163-172, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:6:y:1994:i:2:p:163-172
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1994.tb00094.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ladha, Krishna K, 1991. "A Spatial Model of Legislative Voting with Perceptual Error," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 68(1-3), pages 151-174, January.
    2. Ordeshook,Peter C., 1986. "Game Theory and Political Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521315937.
    3. Kenneth Koford, 1990. "Dimensions, Transactions Costs And Coalitions In Legislative Voting," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 59-82, March.
    4. Tullock, Gordon, 1991. "Duncan Black: The Founding Father. 23 May 1908-14 January 1991," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 125-128, September.
    5. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
    6. Poole, Keith T. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1985. "The political economy of roll-call voting in the "multi-party" congress of the United States," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 45-58.
    7. Koford, Kenneth, 1989. "Dimensions in Congressional Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 949-962, September.
    8. Poole, Keith T. & Rosenthal, Howard & Koford, Kenneth, 1991. "On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 955-976, September.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Valeria Ottonelli & Daniele Porello, 2013. "On the elusive notion of meta-agreement," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 12(1), pages 68-92, February.
    3. Tim Willems, 2014. "You Can Go Your Own Way: Explaining Partisan Support for Independence," Economics Series Working Papers 717, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

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